Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust

Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
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DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.015
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发表时间:
2018-01-01
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Peters, Kim
Peters, Kim
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Fonseca, Miguel A.;Peters, Kim

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事实上,八卦可能是不准确的,有意或无意的,这导致了人们对其在大型社会中建立合作的能力的质疑。我们探讨了八卦准确性对信任和可信度的影响,在人口玩分散的,两个球员的信任游戏。我们观察到流言中自发的不准确性并不是微不足道的,有证据表明这主要是因为流言传播者想要惩罚不值得信任的玩家。虽然这种内源性的不准确性并没有对信任和可信度产生不利影响,但引入高水平的外源性不准确性确实会产生不利影响。但重要的是,我们观察到,当存在高度不准确的八卦时,比不可能沟通时,信任和可信度更高。这表明,即使是不准确的八卦也会引起八卦对象对声誉的一定程度的关注,并且八卦接受者也会根据他们收到的八卦来区分合作伙伴。因此,八卦不需要完全准确,就能有效地诱导合作。(C)2017爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
The fact that gossip can be inaccurate, intentionally or otherwise, has led to questions over its ability to build cooperation in large societies. We explore the impact of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized, two-player trust games. We observed non-trivial levels of spontaneous inaccuracy in gossip, and there was evidence that this was largely due to gossipers' desire to punish untrustworthy players. Although this endogenous inaccuracy did not adversely affect levels of trust and trustworthiness, introducing high levels of exogenous inaccuracy did. Importantly though, we observed greater trust and trustworthiness when highly inaccurate gossip was present than when communication was impossible. This suggests that even inaccurate gossip induces a degree of reputational concern in gossip targets and some willingness among gossip recipients to discriminate between partners on the basis of the gossip they received. Thus, gossip need not be perfectly accurate to effectively induce cooperation. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.