Framework for a Lottery-Based Incentive Scheme and its Influence on Commuting Behaviors-an MIT Case Study

Framework for a Lottery-Based Incentive Scheme and its Influence on Commuting Behaviors-an MIT Case Study
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彩票激励计划框架及其对通勤行为的影响——麻省理工学院案例研究

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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
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通讯作者:
J. Sussman
J. Sussman
中科院分区:
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作者:
Fangping Lu;J. Sussman

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拥挤收费被广泛认为是管理出行需求的最有效手段。由于拥堵收费是向道路使用者收取费用,让他们将出行带来的外部成本内部化,因此人们一直担心它带来的社会公平问题,以及它经常面临的政治反对。本文重点研究了另一种与拥挤定价相反的出行需求管理策略,即一种基于奖励的方案,当通勤者改变出行行为时,它为通勤者提供积极的激励。更具体地说,当通勤者步行、骑自行车、乘坐公共交通或拼车而不是独自开车去上班时,他们可以获得奖励积分。累积的积分可以用来换取确定性的现金奖励,也可以用来参加大抽奖。本文回顾了有关彩票计划对行为影响的研究文献,并修正了一个理论模型来说明彩票如何影响均衡模式的选择。提出了设计这种彩票方案的一般框架,并在此框架的基础上,开发和评估了麻省理工学院实施基于彩票的激励方案来管理通勤者停车需求的几种备选方案。论文导师:约翰·P·阿塔努奇职称:土木与环境工程高级讲师兼副研究员
Congestion pricing has been widely regarded as the most effective technique used to manage travel demand. Since congestion pricing is about charging road users to internalize the external cost induced by their travels, there have been concerns about the social equity issues it raises and the political opposition it often faces. This thesis focuses on another travel demand management strategy that is contrary to congestion pricing, a reward-based scheme which provides positive incentives to commuters when they change their travel behavior. More specifically, commuters could be rewarded credits when they travel to work via walking, bicycling, taking public transit or carpooling instead of driving alone. The credits accrued can either be used to exchange for a deterministic cash prize, or a chance to enter a grand lottery draw. This thesis reviews the research literature to explain the influence of lottery schemes on behaviors and modifies a theoretical model to suggest how equilibrium mode choices can be influenced by lotteries. A general framework to design such a lottery scheme is proposed and, based on the framework, several alternatives to implement a lottery-based incentive scheme to manage commuter parking demand at MIT are developed and evaluated. Thesis Supervisor: John P. Attanucci Title: Senior Lecturer and Research Associate of Civil and Environmental Engineering