A carrier–shipper contract under asymmetric information in the ocean transport industry
A carrier–shipper contract under asymmetric information in the ocean transport industry
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DOI：
10.1007/s10479-017-2532-1
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发表时间：
2017-07
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Ruina Yang;Chung-Yee Lee;Qian Liu;Song Zheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ruina Yang;Chung-Yee Lee;Qian Liu;Song Zheng
我们研究承运人-托运人合同问题在一个单一的时间段（即，1年），包括一个低需求季节，然后是一个高需求季节，在不对称的信息下，由海洋货运业。为了解决这一行业中突出的合同违约问题，我们提出了一种比例要求策略，在该策略中，在高需求季节按合同价格分配给托运人的容量与他在低需求季节的数量承诺成比例。托运人拥有关于淡季需求的私人信息，而承运人则没有。为了诱导真实的信息披露，承运人提供了一个捆绑包，包括两个两部分的资费合同，每个合同针对一个市场状态。在我们的模型中，承运人确定合同捆绑，以最大限度地提高她的预期利润在两个赛季。托运人在观察市场状态后决定签订哪一个合同，然后确定最优的运输数量，使他的总期望成本最小。我们刻画了不对称信息下承运人的最优合同捆绑和托运人在不同市场状态下的最优策略。分析结果表明，在一定条件下，承运人和托运人都可以更好地与一个适当的设计合同束相比，在现货市场上单独答复。我们还调查了系统的结果（例如，托运人最优承诺量、最优合同价格、信息租金和承运人期望利润）受比例要求参数、信息不对称程度和市场状态类型不确定性的影响。
We study the carrier–shipper contracting issue in a single time period (i.e., 1 year) consisting of a low demand season followed by a high demand season under asymmetric information arising from the ocean freight industry. In order to address the contract default problem that is prominent in this industry, we propose a proportion requirement policy in which the capacity allocated to the shipper at the contract price in the high demand season is proportional to his quantity commitment in the low demand season. The shipper has private information about the low season demand while the carrier does not. To induce truthful information revelation, the carrier offers a bundle consisting of two two-part tariff contracts, each of which targets for one market state. In our model, the carrier determines the contract bundle to maximize her expected profit in both seasons. The shipper decides which contract to sign after observing the market state, and then determines the optimal shipping quantity to minimize his total expected cost. We characterize the carriers optimal contract bundle under asymmetric information and the shippers optimal strategy for each market state. The analytical results show that both the carrier and the shipper can be better off with an appropriately designed contract bundle compared with replying solely on the spot market under certain conditions. We also investigate how the outcomes of the system (e.g., the shippers optimal commitment quantity, the optimal contract price, the information rent and the carriers expected profit) are affected by the proportion requirement parameter, the degree of information asymmetry, and the uncertainty of the market state type.