Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information
Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information
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异构供应商——信息不对称装配系统中的合同设计
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.004
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Zhao Ruiqing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lan Yanfei;Cai Xiaoqiang;Shang Changjing;Zhang Lianmin;Zhao Ruiqing
本文研究了装配供应链中两个异质供应商生产互补产品并交付给装配商的供应合同设计问题。一个供应商更可靠，没有供应风险，另一个供应商不太可靠，有供应风险。装配工更好地了解需求，并将这两种类型的组件装配成最终产品。为了诱使装配商如实报告私人信息，更可靠的供应商向装配商提供合同，以确定组件的数量和转移支付。不太可靠的供应商承受中断设计一个合同，其中包括组件的数量，转移支付和任何交付短缺的单位罚款。我们研究的情况下，任何一个供应商首先移动，他们同时移动对称和不对称的需求信息。我们探讨了装配者信息的价值，发现先动者更依赖于不对称信息的存在，后动者从装配者信息中获益更多。此外，我们发现，低可靠性的供应商的低可靠性扩大了先行者的信息价值。我们还研究了合同序列的价值，发现在对称信息下，先行者从顺序合同中获益更多。然而，有趣的是，在信息不对称的情况下，先动者既可能受益于先动者权利，也可能受到先动者权利的损害。我们还发现，低可靠性的不太可靠的供应商不鼓励供应商使用的先行者的权利。
We investigate a supply contract design problem in an assembly supply chain in which two heterogeneous suppliers produce complementary products and deliver them to the assembler. One supplier is more reliable and exhibits no supply risk, and the other is less reliable and exhibits supply risk. The assembler is better informed about demand and assembles these two types of components into final products. To elicit the assembler’s truthful report of private information, the more reliable supplier offers a contract to the assembler to determine the components’ quantities and the transfer payment. The less reliable supplier enduring a disruption designs a contract that includes the components’ quantities, the transfer payment and the unit penalty for any delivery shortfall. We study the cases where either supplier moves first and where they move simultaneously under symmetric and asymmetric demand information. We explore the values of the assembler’s information and find that the first mover is more reliant upon the existence of less asymmetric information and the second mover benefits more from the assembler’ information. Further, we find that a low reliability of the less reliable supplier enlarges the first mover’s value of information. We also examine the values of the contracting sequence and find that under symmetric information, the first mover benefits more from sequential contracting. However, interestingly, under asymmetric information, the first mover may benefit or be harmed by the first-mover right. We also find that a low reliability of the less reliable supplier discourages the supplier from using the first-mover right.