Cooperation in an Uncertain World: For the Maasai of East Africa, Need-Based Transfers Outperform Account-Keeping in Volatile Environments.
Cooperation in an Uncertain World: For the Maasai of East Africa, Need-Based Transfers Outperform Account-Keeping in Volatile Environments.
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DOI：
10.1007/s10745-016-9823-z
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Cronk L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aktipis A;de Aguiar R;Flaherty A;Iyer P;Sonkoi D;Cronk L
Aktipis等人使用基于代理的模型来研究牧民二元组中的风险分担，使用来自Maasai osotua（“脐带”）关系的规则，发现osotua转移导致更多的风险分担和更好的牛群生存，而不是没有转移和转移发生的频率与osotua模拟中所见的频率有关。在这里，我们扩展了这种方法，通过比较osotua式的转移到另一种类型的马赛人之间的牲畜转移称为esile（“债务”）。在osotua，你会问自己是否需要帮助，如果这样做不会威胁到自己的生存，你会给予回应。在稳定的关系中，账户是保留的，债务必须偿还。我们分别称之为“基于需要”和“记账”制度。基于需求的转移比记账带来更多的风险分担和更高的生存率。基于需求的转移也会导致更大的财富平等，并且在博弈论上对记账规则起主导作用。
Using an agent-based model to study risk-pooling in herder dyads using rules derived from Maasai osotua (“umbilical cord”) relationships, Aktipis et al. found that osotua transfers led to more risk-pooling and better herd survival than both no transfers and transfers that occurred at frequencies tied to those seen in the osotua simulations. Here we expand this approach by comparing osotua-style transfers to another type of livestock transfer among Maasai known as esile (“debt”). In osotua, one asks if in need, and one gives in response to such requests if doing so will not threaten one’s own survival. In esile relationships, accounts are kept and debts must be repaid. We refer to these as “need-based” and “account-keeping” systems, respectively. Need-based transfers lead to more risk pooling and higher survival than account keeping. Need-based transfers also lead to greater wealth equality and are game theoretically dominant to account-keeping rules.