Signaling When No One Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment In One-Shot Anonymous Interactions
Signaling When No One Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment In One-Shot Anonymous Interactions
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DOI：
10.1037/pspi0000186
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发表时间：
2020-01-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Rand, David G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jordan, Jillian J.;Rand, David G.
道德惩罚可以通过向观察者发出值得信赖的信号，从而带来声誉上的好处。然而，为什么人们在没有人看到的情况下也要惩罚呢？我们认为，人们往往依赖于启发式，即声誉通常处于危险之中，因此，即使在一次性匿名互动中，对声誉的担忧也会形成道德上的愤怒和惩罚。然后，我们使用Amazon Mechanical Turk的数据来支持该帐户。在匿名实验中，受试者（总n = 8,440）报告说，当他们不能通过直接的亲社会行为（与第三方分享）来表明自己的可信度时，他们对他人的自私行为的反应更愤怒——这样，如果互动不是匿名的，惩罚将具有更大的信号价值。此外，中介分析表明，共享机会通过影响声誉问题来减少愤怒。此外，衡量代价高昂的惩罚的匿名实验（总n = 6076）显示了相同的模式：当不可能分享时，受试者惩罚更多。此外，重要的是，适度分析提供了一些证据，表明分享机会不仅仅是通过诱导非分享者对自私或虚伪的厌恶感来减少愤怒和惩罚。最后，我们通过调查个体在故意性方面的差异来支持启发式的具体作用。在我们的匿名惩罚实验中，较少深思熟虑的个体（通常更依赖启发式）对分享机会更敏感。但是。重要的是，不是在声誉受到威胁的惩罚实验中（总n = 3,422）；而不是在我们匿名的愤怒实验中（谴责是没有成本的）。总之，我们的研究结果表明，当没有人在观看时，声誉线索仍然可以塑造愤怒，对那些依赖启发式的人来说，这是代价高昂的惩罚。
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others' selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)-such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments. but. critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and-among individuals who rely on heuristics-costly punishment.