Dynamic social behaviour in a bacterium: Pseudomonas aeruginosa partially compensates for siderophore loss to cheats
Dynamic social behaviour in a bacterium: Pseudomonas aeruginosa partially compensates for siderophore loss to cheats
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/jeb.12126
复制
发表时间：
2013-06-01
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Harrison, F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Harrison, F.
合作的基础是各种现象，包括多细胞生命的起源、人类在经济市场中的行为以及病原菌致病的机制。用微生物进行的实验提高了我们对合作如何、何时以及为什么演变的理解，但微生物合作可以在多大程度上概括动物行为的各个方面仍存在争议。例如，理解行为反应规则的演变(一个人应该如何回应另一个人合作或叛逃的决定？)是社会进化理论的关键部分，但这种规律在社会微生物中的可能存在还没有被探索过。在一个特定的背景下(动物的双亲照料)，如果个人通过增加自己对合作的投资来应对伴侣的叛逃，合作就会保持，但不会完全弥补叛逃者缺乏投资的情况。这被称为“部分补偿”。在这里，我证明了对不合作作弊者的存在的部分补偿也在一种微生物的社会行为中观察到：铜绿假单胞菌合作生产清除铁的铁载体。在有作弊的情况下进化一段时间来维持这种反应，而在没有作弊的情况下进化导致补偿行为的丧失。这些结果表明(I)细菌社会行为的显著灵活性，(Ii)部分补偿作为社会反应规则的潜在普遍性，以及(Iii)需要数学模型来探索多人社会互动中反应规则的演变。
Cooperation underlies diverse phenomena including the origins of multicellular life, human behaviour in economic markets and the mechanisms by which pathogenic bacteria cause disease. Experiments with microorganisms have advanced our understanding of how, when and why cooperation evolves, but the extent to which microbial cooperation can recapitulate aspects of animal behaviour is debated. For instance, understanding the evolution of behavioural response rules (how should one individual respond to another's decision to cooperate or defect?) is a key part of social evolution theory, but the possible existence of such rules in social microbes has not been explored. In one specific context (biparental care in animals), cooperation is maintained if individuals respond to a partner's defection by increasing their own investment into cooperation, but not so much that this fully compensates for the defector's lack of investment. This is termed partial compensation'. Here, I show that partial compensation for the presence of noncooperating cheats' is also observed in a microbial social behaviour: the cooperative production of iron-scavenging siderophores by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. A period of evolution in the presence of cheats maintains this response, whereas evolution in the absence of cheats leads to a loss of compensatory behaviour. These results demonstrate (i) the remarkable flexibility of bacterial social behaviour, (ii) the potential generality of partial compensation as a social response rule and (iii) the need for mathematical models to explore the evolution of response rules in multi-player social interactions.