Priming, Replication, and the Hardest Science
Priming, Replication, and the Hardest Science
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DOI：
10.1177/1745691613513470
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发表时间：
2014-01-01
影响因子：
12.6
通讯作者：
Cesario, Joseph
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Cesario, Joseph
最近，人们对行为启动效应的可复制性提出了担忧，并呼吁确定具有在任何背景下和任何人群中都能获得的效果的启动方法。我认为，这种期望是被误导的，与进化上对大脑作为计算器官的理解不一致。相反，我们应该期待启动效应对实验特征和受试者群体的变化高度敏感。这种变化不会使启动效果变得轻率或反复无常，相反，可以先验地预测。然而，如果没有理论说明导致这种差异的确切偶然性，那么复制另一位研究人员的发现的失败必然会对可以做出的推论含糊不清。启动研究还不是存在这样的理论的阶段，因此失败在目前是没有信息的。归根结底，启动研究人员本身必须提供其自身效果的直接复制；研究人员在履行这一责任方面一直存在缺陷，并导致了目前的混乱状态。本文提出的建议既反映了对启动研究人员的做法的担忧，也反映了对未能复制他人启动效应的研究人员的不适当期望。
Concerns have been raised recently about the replicability of behavioral priming effects, and calls have been issued to identify priming methodologies with effects that can be obtained in any context and with any population. I argue that such expectations are misguided and inconsistent with evolutionary understandings of the brain as a computational organ. Rather, we should expect priming effects to be highly sensitive to variations in experimental features and subject populations. Such variation does not make priming effects frivolous or capricious but instead can be predicted a priori. However, absent theories specifying the precise contingencies that lead to such variation, failures to replicate another researcher's findings will necessarily be ambiguous with respect to the inferences that can be made. Priming research is not yet at the stage where such theories exist, and therefore failures are uninformative at the current time. Ultimately, priming researchers themselves must provide direct replications of their own effects; researchers have been deficient in meeting this responsibility and have contributed to the current state of confusion. The recommendations issued in this article reflect concerns both with the practice of priming researchers and with the inappropriate expectations of researchers who have failed to replicate others' priming effects.