Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice
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差别税制与职业选择
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Pavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Renato Gomes;Jean;A. Pavan
我们在一个Roy模型中研究了非线性所得税，在该模型中代理人的生产率是特定于部门的。我们证明，当所得税可以是特定于部门的时候，钻石-莫里斯定理(根据该定理，第二好的税种显示了生产效率)是不成立的：社会福利(无论是罗尔斯主义的还是加权的功利主义的)可以通过将一些代理人分配到生产率最低的部门来增加。通过牺牲生产效率，计划者造成了总产出的二阶损失，但获得了再分配信息成本的一阶降低。当政府被限制在统一的所得税时间表时，只要销售税可以针对特定行业，就会得到同样的结果。在后一种情况下，我们的结果还意味着阿特金森-斯蒂格利茨定理的失败(根据该定理，当对消费和休闲的偏好是可分离的时，就像在我们的经济中一样，次佳的偏好可以在零销售税的情况下实施)。
We study nonlinear income taxation in a Roy model in which agents’ productivity is sector-specific. We show that when income taxes can be sector-specific, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (according to which the second-best displays production efficiency) fails: social welfare (be it Rawlsian or Weighed Utilitarian) can be increased by assigning some agents to their least productive sector. By sacrificing production efficiency, the planner incurs second-order losses in total output, but obtains a first-order reduction in the informational costs of redistribution. The same result obtains when the government is constrained to a uniform income tax schedule, as long as sales taxes can be made sector-specific. In this latter case, our result also implies failure of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem (according to which, when preferences over consumption and leisure are separable, as they are in our economy, the second-best can be implemented with zero sales taxes).
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem
通讯作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem