Does Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Really Alleviate Agency Conflicts?
Does Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Really Alleviate Agency Conflicts?
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DOI：
10.1111/acfi.12198
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发表时间：
2017-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Baolei Qi;Liuchuang Li;Qing Zhou;Jinghui Sun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Baolei Qi;Liuchuang Li;Qing Zhou;Jinghui Sun
本研究探讨财务报告内部控制是否会影响管理层对公司资源的侵占。我们通过研究内部控制中的重大缺陷对公司现金持有量和资本支出价值的潜在影响来做到这一点。我们的研究结果表明，ICFR促进了资本市场的监督和纪律，从而消除了代理问题。我们的研究结果支持的前提下，高质量的财务报告损害管理人员的能力，利用公司资源，在一个自我服务的方式。
This study investigates whether internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) alleviates the managerial expropriation of corporate resources. We do this by examining the potential effects of material weaknesses in internal control on the values of corporate cash holdings and capital expenditures. Our findings suggest that ICFR facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets and thus alleviates the agency problems. Our results support the premise that high financial reporting quality impairs managers' abilities to use corporate resources in a self-serving manner.