The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos crisis of 1970: crisis-management of a non-crisis?
The Nixon Administration and the Cienfuegos crisis of 1970: crisis-management of a non-crisis?
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尼克松政府和 1970 年西恩富戈斯危机：非危机的危机管理？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Asaf Siniver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Asaf Siniver
摘要 本文利用华盛顿和伦敦国家档案馆新解密的文件，重新审视尼克松政府在1970年西恩富戈斯危机期间的外交政策制定。本文试图回答危机期间政策决策的两个基本问题：为什么政府在对危机进行高度保密的同时奉行“一切照旧”的公共政策，以及这是如何实现的？这些问题的答案可以分别从政府在“危机之秋”期间所处的独特情况以及基辛格对国家安全委员会机制和程序的操纵中找到。
Abstract This article employs newly declassified documents from the National Archives in Washington and London to re-examine foreign policymaking of the Nixon Administration during the Cienfuegos crisis of 1970. The article seeks to answer two fundamental questions with regard to policy decision-making during the crisis: why did the Administration pursue a public policy of ‘business as usual’ while cloaking the crisis in extreme secrecy, and how was this achieved? Answers to these questions can be found in the unique situation the Administration found itself during the ‘Autumn of Crises’, and in Kissinger’s manipulation of NSC mechanisms and procedures, respectively.