Incentives and Discrimination
Incentives and Discrimination
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DOI：
10.1257/0002828041464434
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发表时间：
2004-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Eyal Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eyal Winter
最佳激励机制可能要求代理人获得不同的奖励，即使他们完全相同，并被诱导采取相同的行动。我们通过一个简单的激励模型来证明这一点，在这个模型中，代理人关于努力的决定被映射成项目成功的概率。我们给出了最优激励机制具有歧视性的充分必要条件。我们还表明，当且仅当技术具有不断增加的规模回报时，需要对所有代理人进行充分歧视。在非对称的框架中，我们表明，可以忽略不计的代理人的属性的差异可能会导致在唯一的最佳机制的奖励的主要差异。
Optimal incentive mechanisms may require that agents are rewarded differentially even when they are completely identical and are induced to act the same. We demonstrate this point by means of a simple incentive model where agents’ decisions about effort exertion is mapped into a probability that the project will succeed. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal incentive mechanisms to be discriminatory. We also show that full discrimination across all agents is required if and only if the technology has increasing return to scale. In the non-symmetric framework we show that negligible differences in agents’ attributes may result in major differences in rewards in the unique optimal mechanism.