Efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract
Efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract
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有效的违约信赖和损害措施
DOI：
10.2307/3003668
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Rogerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Rogerson
本文考虑一种情况，即商品的买方或卖方必须在交换前承担特定资本的支出，以便准备使用或准备出售该产品。假设违约后讨价还价是可能的，并以合作的方式进行，买卖双方以特定的方式对这种讨价还价的结果形成预期。如果没有可执行的合同，特定租金的潜在可分配性会导致低效率的投资水平。通常用于执行合同的三种损害衡量标准被证明会产生低效的高投资水平，并按从好到差的帕累托排序如下：具体履约、预期损害和信赖损害。
This article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it. It is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion, and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way. Without enforceable contracts, the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment. Three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be Pareto-ranked from best to worst as follows: specific performance, expectation damages, and reliance damages.