Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome
Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome
复制标题
缺乏对未来私有化政策的承诺可能会导致最糟糕的福利结果
DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2019.09.020
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Matsumura Toshihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haraguchi Junichi;Matsumura Toshihiro
我们调查缺乏对未来私有化政策承诺的福利后果。在竞争结构由私营企业进入决定后，政府实施私有化政策。我们发现，在均衡中，如果私人公司期望政府将公共公司完全私有化（国有化），政府就会将公共公司完全私有化（国有化）。这是因为进入市场的公司数量的增加增加了政府对上市公司私有化的激励，这减轻了未来的竞争并刺激了进入。在所有可能的（均衡或非均衡）福利私有化政策中，完全私有化均衡是最糟糕的私有化政策，因为它导致私营企业过度进入市场。部分承诺最低限度的公共所有权份额可能会缓解这一问题。
We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.