Information, the dual economy, and development
Information, the dual economy, and development
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DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00062
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发表时间：
1998-10-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Newman, AF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Banerjee, AV;Newman, AF
我们在一个现代化经济的一般均衡模型中考察了不同制度安排之间的相互作用。有一个现代部门，生产率很高，但信息不对称。这是一个生产率低但信息不对称程度低的传统部门。因此，现代部门的代理成本使消费贷款变得困难，而在传统部门，这种贷款很容易做到。由此产生的信贷供应和生产率之间的权衡意味着，不是每个人都将转向现代部门。事实上，自由放任的现代化水平可能无法最大化社会净剩余，这种情况在长期内也可能存在：在动态模型中，“涓滴”效应将现代化进程与现代部门代理成本的降低联系起来。这种影响可能太弱，经济可能陷入陷阱，永远无法完全现代化。两个部门的结构也产生了一个自然的库兹涅茨倒U假设的理论测试场：我们表明，即使在“部门转移”类模型，这种现象是不稳健的模型规格的小变化。
We examine the interactions between different institutional arrangements in a general equilibrium model of a modernizing economy. There is a modern sector, where productivity is high but information asymmetries are. large, and a traditional sector where productivity is low but information asymmetries are small. Consequently, agency costs in the modern sector make consumption lending difficult, while such lending is readily done in the traditional sector. The resulting trade-off between credit availability and productivity implies that not everyone will move to the modem sector. In fact, the laissez-faire level of modernization may fail to maximize net social surplus.This situation may also hold in the long run: in a dynamic version of the model, a "trickle-down" effect links the process of modernization with reduction in modern sector agency costs. This effect may be too weak and the economy may get stuck in a trap and never fully modernize. The two-sector structure also yields a natural theoretical testing ground for the Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis: we show that even within the "sectoral shifting" class of models, this phenomenon is not robust to small changes in model specification.