Engineering an Election
Engineering an Election
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Jonathan Zittrain
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作者：
Jonathan Zittrain
本文考虑了数字选区不公正的假设示例：中介机构选择性地呈现信息以满足其议程而不是服务其用户。任何服务都有可能对其所呈现的内容进行个性化，特别是当有大量物品可供提供而一次只能显示很少的物品时。无论是搜索结果、热门推文还是 Facebook 更新，每个策展服务都使用专有的配方，从无限的成分中提取信息来准备我们的提要，并且每个服务都可以对其用户进行不公正划分，区分那些它认为会支持其目标的用户和那些不会支持其目标的用户。没有一家承诺中立，无论这意味着什么，尽管包括谷歌和必应在内的一些公司明确区分了公司自己的公式驱动的结果与赞助广告所显示的结果。如果提要背后的部分秘密武器服务于厨师而不是顾客的目的怎么办？也许公司可以选择是否成为信息受托人，就像为买卖股票和债券提供建议的商人可以选择投资顾问或经纪人一样。不管怎样，信息中介机构的核心责任是以不旨在促进中介机构政治目标的方式提供他人数据。
This essay considers a hypothetical example of digital gerrymandering: the selective presentation of information by an intermediary to meet its agenda rather than to serve its users. It is possible on any service that personalizes what it presents, particularly when there is an abundance of items to offer up and only a few that can be shown at a time. Whether for search results, top tweets, or Facebook updates, each curating service uses a proprietary recipe to draw from boundless ingredients to prepare our feeds, and each is in a position to gerrymander its users, distinguishing between those it thinks will be supportive of its goals and those who will not. None promises neutrality, whatever that might mean, although some — including Google and Bing — clearly distinguish between results driven by the companies’ own formulas versus those displayed as sponsored advertising.What if part of the secret sauce behind feeds serves the aims of the cook rather than the customer? Perhaps companies could choose whether to become information fiduciaries, the way that businesspeople who make suggestions on buying and selling stocks and bonds can elect between careers as investment advisors or brokers. However agreed, a central responsibility of an information intermediary would be to serve up others’ data in ways not designed to further the political goals of the intermediary.