The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior
The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior
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DOI：
10.1162/003355301753265543
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发表时间：
2001-11-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Shea, DF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Madrian, BC;Shea, DF
本文分析了自动登记对401（k）储蓄行为的影响。我们有两个关键发现。首先，401（k）参与率在自动登记下明显更高。其次，在自动登记下雇用的401（k）参与者中，有相当一部分人保留了默认的缴费率和基金分配，尽管在自动登记之前雇用的员工很少选择这种特定的结果。这种"违约"行为似乎是由于参与者的惰性和员工将违约视为投资建议的看法。这些发现对401（k）储蓄计划的设计以及任何类型的社会保障改革（包括个人控制的个人账户）都有影响。他们还揭示了更普遍的经济和非经济（行为）因素在决定个人储蓄行为的重要性。
This paper analyzes the impact of automatic enrollment on 401(k) savings behavior. We have two key findings. First, 401(k) participation is significantly higher under automatic enrollment. Second, a substantial fraction of 401(k) participants hired under automatic enrollment retain both the default contribution rate and fund allocation even though few employees hired before automatic enrollment picked this particular outcome. This "default" behavior appears to result from participant inertia and from employee perceptions of the default as investment advice. These findings have implications for the design of 401(k) savings plans as well as for any type of Social Security reform that includes personal accounts over which individuals have control. They also shed light more generally on the importance of both economic and noneconomic (behavioral) factors in the determination of individual savings behavior.