Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty
Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1208417109
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发表时间：
2012-10-23
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Dannenberg, Astrid
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barrett, Scott;Dannenberg, Astrid
“危险的”气候变化的不确定性如何影响国际合作的前景？气候谈判通常被描述为一个囚徒困境游戏;从整体上看，各国减少排放会更好，但自身利益驱使它们继续排放。我们提供了基于分析框架的实验证据，表明对跨越危险门槛的恐惧可能会将气候谈判变成一场协调游戏，从而使避免危险门槛的集体行动实际上得到保证。这些结果对于跨越阈值的影响的不确定性是鲁棒的，但是阈值位置的不确定性会使博弈回到囚徒困境，导致合作崩溃。我们的研究解释了一个悖论，即为什么各国会同意一个旨在降低灾难风险的集体目标，但却表现得好像对这种风险视而不见。
How does uncertainty about "dangerous" climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners' dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured. These results are robust to uncertainty about the impact of crossing a threshold, but uncertainty about the location of the threshold turns the game back into a prisoners' dilemma, causing cooperation to collapse. Our research explains the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.