Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design
Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design
复制标题
互补品组装中的抵制：市场设计的一个问题
DOI：
10.1257/aer.102.3.360
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Weyl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Kominers;E. Weyl
抵制问题阻碍了私人（自愿和自筹资金）从许多自私的卖方那里收集补充物品，如土地或分散的频谱。虽然充分尊重卖方财产权的机制无法缓解这些抵制问题，但传统的解决办法，如使用强制性的政府权力“征用权”来征用财产，可能会鼓励浪费和不公平的集会。我们讨论的问题，坚持创造市场的有效运作，以及以前的方法如何使用管制胁迫来解决这些挑战。然后，我们调查时，鼓励竞争可以部分或全部取代胁迫，特别是专注于频谱分配的问题。
Holdout problems prevent private (voluntary and self-financing) assembly of complementary goods--such as land or dispersed spectrum--from many self-interested sellers. While mechanisms that fully respect sellers' property rights cannot alleviate these holdout problems, traditional solutions, such as the use of coercive government powers of "eminent domain" to expropriate property, can encourage wasteful and unfair assemblies. We discuss the problems holdout creates for the efficient operation of markets and how previous approaches have used regulated coercion to address these challenges. We then investigate when encouraging competition can partially or fully substitute for coercion, focusing particularly on questions of spectrum allocation.