The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union
The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union
复制标题
欧盟司法独立的政治基础
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Kelemen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Kelemen
本文探讨了欧盟司法独立的政治基础，并询问欧洲法院在多大程度上不受可能威胁司法独立的法院限制机制的影响。本文回顾了美国法律和政治文献中确定的主要法院限制机制，并评估了这些机制在限制欧洲法院方面的应用程度。证据和分析表明，欧洲法院与文献中确定的每一种主要法院遏制机制都保持着良好的隔离。
This contribution explores the political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union and asks to what degree the ECJ is insulated against court curbing mechanisms that might threaten judicial independence. The contribution reviews the major court curbing mechanisms identified in the literature on American law and politics and assesses the extent to which these mechanisms might be applied in restraining the ECJ. The evidence and analysis suggests that the ECJ is remarkably well insulated against each of the major court curbing mechanisms identified in the literature.