Regulators as 'agents': power and personality in risk regulation and a role for agent-based simulation
Regulators as 'agents': power and personality in risk regulation and a role for agent-based simulation
复制标题
监管者作为“代理人”：风险监管中的权力和个性以及基于代理人的模拟的作用
DOI：
10.1080/13669877.2010.486075
复制
发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Davies G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Davies G
我们批判性地考察了在风险监管决策中，证据和知识是如何在不同行为者（代理人）之间进行中介的。在对情境和监管过程进行梳理之后，我们探讨了权力和人格在证据被合成并用于风险决策时可能发挥的作用，并对应用心理学、基于代理人的模拟和监管科学的相关文献进行了综述。我们提出了采用基于代理的工具来解决证据充分性和解决监管决策中的不确定性的案例。参考基于智能体的决策的其他环境应用，我们提出了智能体模型如何代表权力结构和人格特征，以及对监管科学中介的相关影响。这一批判性审查对环境决策的证据结构以及在便利监管环境中运作的现代监管机构所需的个人特征具有启示意义。
We critically examine how evidence and knowledge are brokered between the various actors (agents) in regulatory decisions on risk. Following a précis of context and regulatory process, we explore the role power and personality might play as evidence is synthesised and used to inform risk decisions, providing a review of the relevant literature from applied psychology, agent‐based simulation and regulatory science. We make a case for the adoption of agent‐based tools for addressing the sufficiency of evidence and resolving uncertainty in regulatory decisions. Referring to other environmental applications of agent‐based decision‐making, we propose how an agent model might represent power structures and personality characteristics with the attending implications for the brokering of regulatory science. This critical review has implications for the structuring of evidence that informs environmental decisions and the personal traits required of modern regulators operating in facilitative regulatory settings.