The power of corporate control in the global ownership network
The power of corporate control in the global ownership network
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pone.0237862
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发表时间：
2020-08-27
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Kurizaki, Shuhei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mizuno, Takayuki;Doi, Shohei;Kurizaki, Shuhei
随着指数基金和交易所交易基金（ETF）的被动投资变得普遍，全球资本市场的公司控制结构比以前更加复杂。我们提出了一种新的模型和计算算法来衡量股东在全球经济中控制公司的权力。我们的方法考虑了如何整合分散所有权所附带的分散投票权以产生公司控制权。通过分析2016年全球6900万股东所持有的4900万家公司的所有权，我们发现，如果我们充分评估分散所有权带来的间接影响，全球公司控制权的格局就会有所不同。特别是，公司控制权的大部分似乎集中在主权政府手中，这一点超出了人们之前的认识。然而，如果我们使用传统方法，这种政府能力是“隐藏的”。此外，金融机构似乎并不像之前强调的那么强大。这些结果为学者和政策制定者指出了重要的金融和政治风险。
As passive investment through index funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) has become pervasive, the structure of corporate control in the global capital market is more complex than before. We propose a new model and calculation algorithm to measure a shareholder's power to control corporations in the global economy. Our method takes into account how fragmented voting rights attached to dispersed ownership may be consolidated to generate corporate control. Analyzing the ownership holdings in 49 million companies worldwide by 69 million shareholders in 2016, we find that the landscape of global corporate control appears differently if we adequately evaluate indirect influence via dispersed ownership. In particular, a larger portion of corporate control appears to be concentrated in the hands of sovereign governments than has been recognized before. Yet, such governmental capacities are "hidden" if we use the conventional method. Moreover, financial institutions appear to not be as powerful as emphasized before. These results point to important financial and political risks both for scholars and policymakers.