STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS
STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS
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DOI：
10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-j
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发表时间：
1990-10-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
YOUNG, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
FOSTER, D;YOUNG, P
进化稳定策略（ESS）的概念是研究自然选择动力学的有用工具。然而，它的局限性之一是，它没有捕捉到长期稳定的概念时，系统受到随机效应。我们定义了随机动力系统的稳定性概念，并表明它不同于传统的ESS和动力系统中的吸引子的概念。随机稳定集可以用势理论的最新进展来分析计算。
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of natural selection. One of its limitations, however, is that it does not capture the notion of long-run stability when the system is subjected to stochastic effects. We define the concept of stability in a stochastic dynamical system, and show that it differs from both the traditional ESS and the concept of an attractor in a dynamical system. The stochastically stable set may be computed analytically using recent advances in potential theory.