PROFESSIONAL VERSUS CONSUMER INTERESTS IN REGULATION - THE CASE OF THE UNITED-STATES CHILD-CARE INDUSTRY
PROFESSIONAL VERSUS CONSUMER INTERESTS IN REGULATION - THE CASE OF THE UNITED-STATES CHILD-CARE INDUSTRY
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DOI：
10.1080/00036849200000023
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发表时间：
1992-06-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
TINNIN, TD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
LOWENBERG, AD;TINNIN, TD
专业许可证通过设置进入该行业的壁垒而使生产者受益。但如果许可证促使生产商提供高质量的产品，消费者也可能受益。消费者还是生产者从许可证中获益最多，可以通过审查许可证要求对总消费的影响来确定。本文采用一个横截面模型来估计国家许可证规则和儿童保育服务消费的变化之间的关系。研究结果表明，专业利益，而不是消费者的利益，是占主导地位的美国儿童保育行业的监管标准的设置。
Professional licensure benefits producers by creating entry barriers into the profession. but consumers might also gain if licensure induces producers to supply high levels of quality. Whether consumers or producers gain most from licensure can be determined by examining the effect of licensure requirements on aggregate consumption. This paper uses a cross-sectional model to estimate the relationship between variations in state licensure rules and consumption of child care services. The results suggest that professional interests, and not those of consumers, are dominant in the setting of regulatory standards for the US child care industry.