Quantifying the influence of the tobacco industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco Products Directive
Quantifying the influence of the tobacco industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco Products Directive
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DOI：
10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-051822
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发表时间：
2014-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
5.2
通讯作者：
Stuckler, David
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Costa, Helia;Gilmore, Anna B.;Stuckler, David
目的烟草业花费大量资金游说欧盟机构，但这种游说是否会对烟草政策产生重大影响尚不清楚。我们使用新的定量文本挖掘技术来评估行业压力对有争议的欧盟烟草产品指令修订的影响。使用他们提交给欧盟磋商和影响评估的文本来评估包括烟草行业、健康非政府组织和烟草零售商在内的18个利益相关者的设计政策立场。使用Wordscores计算词频，我们开发了一个范围从0-烟草行业到1-公共卫生组织的量表，然后用于跟踪欧盟委员会2010年咨询文件的政策立场变化，其2012年的最终提案以及欧洲议会和理事会于2014年3月批准的立法。健康非政府组织，包括零售商（Ω = 0.35）、工会（Ω = 0.34）和出版商（Ω = 0.33和Ω = 0.40）。随着时间的推移，欧盟委员会对烟草业的立场从ω = 0.52（95% CI 0.50至0.54）转变为ω = 0.40（95% CI 0.39至0.42）。这一转变反映了委员会文件中越来越多地使用与企业和经济有关的词语。我们的研究结果是强大的替代方法的评分政策立场在EU documents.Conclusions使用定量文本挖掘技术，我们观察到，烟草行业的游说活动在欧盟与欧盟烟草制品指令立法对烟草行业的意见书的重大政策转变。根据《烟草控制框架公约》，需要制定额外的治理战略，以防止烟草业对欧盟决策产生不当影响。
Objective The tobacco industry spends large sums lobbying the European Union (EU) institutions, yet whether such lobbying significantly affects tobacco policy is not well understood. We used novel quantitative text mining techniques to evaluate the impact of industry pressure on the contested EU Tobacco Products Directive revision.Design Policy positions of 18 stakeholders including the tobacco industry, health NGOs and tobacco retailers were evaluated using their text submissions to EU consultations and impact assessments. Using Wordscores to calculate word frequencies, we developed a scale ranging from 0-tobacco industry to 1-public health organisations, which was then used to track changes in the policy position of the European Commission's 2010 consultation document, its 2012 final proposal and the European Parliament and Council's approved legislation in March 2014.Results Several stakeholders' positions were closer to the tobacco industry than that of health NGOs, including retailers (omega= 0.35), trade unions (omega= 0.34) and publishers (omega= 0.33 and omega= 0.40). Over time the European Commission's position shifted towards the tobacco industry from omega= 0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54) to omega= 0.40 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.42). This transition reflected an increasing use of words pertaining to business and the economy in the Commission's document. Our findings were robust to alternative methods of scoring policy positions in EU documents.Conclusions Using quantitative text mining techniques, we observed that tobacco industry lobbying activity at the EU was associated with significant policy shifts in the EU Tobacco Products Directive legislation towards the tobacco industry's submissions. In the light of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, additional governance strategies are needed to prevent undue influence of the tobacco industry on EU policy making.