Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning.
Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning.
复制标题
故事理解和反事实推理。
DOI：
10.1037/0278-7393.29.5.904
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bartolone,Jake
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Trabasso,Tom;Bartolone,Jake
D. Kahneman和A.特沃斯基（Tversky，1982）在一项关于反事实推理的开创性研究中，声称对模拟启发式的经验支持，其中转换不寻常条件的容易程度决定了它们被选为正常条件的原因。对他们故事的话语分析揭示了解释和正常性的混淆。一个联结主义者对在线理解和记忆访问的模拟，在没有转换的情况下，解释了他们的数据。在2个实验中，正态性和解释独立变化。解释而非正态性影响阅读后反事实条件的等级排序。在模拟中的替代条件的访问再次是最好的预测实证研究结果。理解和记忆在故事传达决策信息的地方起作用，如反事实推理和后见之明偏见。
D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1982), in a seminal study on counterfactual reasoning, claimed empirical support for a simulation heuristic wherein ease of converting unusual conditions determines their selection as causes over normal conditions. Discourse analysis of their stories revealed a confounding of explanation and normality. A connectionist simulation of online comprehension and memory access of alternative conditions without conversion accounted for their data. Normality and explanation were varied independently in 2 experiments. Explanation but not normality affected the rank ordering of counterfactual conditions after reading. Access of alternative conditions in simulation was again the best predictor of empirical findings. Comprehension and memory operate where stories communicate information for decision making such as counterfactual reasoning and hindsight bias.