Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality
Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality
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DOI：
10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.06.003
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发表时间：
2015-12-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Cushman, Fiery
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cushman, Fiery
心理状态表征是人类道德判断的重要输入。这一事实常常被总结为：我们将道德谴责限制在“故意”伤害上。这个简单的描述是理论的开始，但不是理论的结束。意向行为的民间概念有着丰富的内在结构，它包含了世界上心理状态、行为和事态之间的一系列因果关系。道德判断显示出对所有这三个要素的敏感度的微妙模式：精神状态（如信念和欲望）、一个人执行的行为以及这些行为的后果。将有意行为解构为其基本片段将使未来的理论能够重建我们对道德判断的理解。
Mental state representations are a crucial input to human moral judgment. This fact is often summarized by saying that we restrict moral condemnation to `intentional' harms. This simple description is the beginning of a theory, however, not the end of one. There is rich internal structure to the folk concept of intentional action, which comprises a series of causal relations between mental states, actions and states of affairs in the world. Moral judgment shows nuanced patterns of sensitivity to all three of these elements: mental states (like beliefs and desires), the actions that a person performs, and the consequences of those actions. Deconstructing intentional action into its elemental fragments will enable future theories to reconstruct our understanding of moral judgment.