Booted : An Analysis of a Payment Intervention on a DDoS-for-Hire Service
Booted : An Analysis of a Payment Intervention on a DDoS-for-Hire Service
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Ryan Brunt
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作者：
Ryan Brunt
分布式拒绝服务（DDoS）攻击已经成为一种日益增长的威胁，在很大程度上，这种威胁已经被DDoS租用或“引导程序”服务商品化。在本案例研究中，我们分析了一个更大的引导服务VDoS泄露的细粒度“地面实况”数据，该服务在两年中赚取了超过597，000美元，并发起了915，000次DDoS攻击和48次攻击年（即，VDoS受害者面临的DDoS时间量）。数据的时间段包括支付干预之前和之后的数据，这为了解其如何影响VDoS的运营提供了难得的机会。我们发现，VDoS的收入和用户群在这种支付干预之前一直在增长，之后开始下降。我们的分析表明，很少有现有客户从受监管的支付方式转向比特币。我们还发现，在支付干预期间，VDoS在发起的攻击和攻击时间方面的危害都减少了40%（每月减少40，000次攻击和2个攻击年）。然而，在我们的数据结束之前，VDoS可能仍然有利可图，尽管较少。
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become a growing threat that, to a large extent, have become commoditized by DDoS-for-hire, or “booter”, services. In this case study, we analyze leaked fine-grain “ground truth” data from a larger booter service, VDoS, which earned over $597,000 over two years and launched 915,000 DDoS attacks and 48 attack years (i.e., the amount of DDoS time faced by victims of VDoS). The time period of the data includes data before and after a payment intervention, providing a rare opportunity to understand how it impacted VDoS’s operation. We find that VDoS’s revenue and subscriber base were growing before this payment intervention and began to decline afterwards. Our analysis shows that few existing customers switch from a regulated payment method to Bitcoin. We also find that harm from VDoS in terms of attacks launched and attack time both decrease by 40% (40,000 fewer attacks and 2 fewer attack years per month) during the payment intervention. However, VDoS likely remained profitable, albeit less, until the end of our data.