Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
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无线电频谱重新分配的经济学和计算机科学
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1701997114
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
I. Segal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kevin Leyton;Paul R. Milgrom;I. Segal
美国联邦通信委员会最近的“激励拍卖”是在两种不同类型的用途之间重新分配无线电频率的首次拍卖：从广播电视到无线互联网访问，不仅是选择市场规则来管理固定的集合。潜在的交易，但要确定广播公司的财产权，要交换的商品，要交易的数量，计算程序，甚至某些绩效目标。一个必不可少的挑战是使拍卖变得足够简单，同时还可以确保计算能够处理并能够提供几乎有效的结果。
The recent “incentive auction” of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters’ property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.