"Bayesian estimation of entry games with multiple players and multiple equilibria,"
"Bayesian estimation of entry games with multiple players and multiple equilibria,"
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“具有多个玩家和多个均衡的入门游戏的贝叶斯估计，”
DOI：
10.1111/jere.12108
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Yuko Onishi and Yasuhiro Omori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
牧原出;御厨貴;井上章一;五十嵐太郎;佐藤信;奈良岡聰哲;手塚洋輔;砂原庸介;中村武生;松宮貴之;朴喜用;小宮京;水津太郎;Ikuo Ota and Chiharu Maeda;田村和彦;Yuko Onishi and Yasuhiro Omori
在实证研究中，进入博弈模型经常被用来研究企业利润的性质和企业间竞争的性质。然而，当寡头垄断市场中有多个参与者时，由此产生的多重均衡使得以往的研究很难在不使用不合理假设的情况下估计完全信息、静态和离散博弈中参与者的支付函数。为了克服这一困难，本文提出了一个实用的估计方法，进入游戏的三个球员使用贝叶斯方法。一些温和的假设施加在支付函数，平均竞争效果是用来捕捉进入的企业数量的影响，我们提出的方法适用于日本航空公司的数据从2000年，当有三个主要的航空公司，全日空，日航和JAS。模型比较进行调查的性质，这些日本航空公司之间的战略互动。
Entry game models are often used to study the nature of firms’ profits and the nature of competition among firms in empirical studies. However, when there are multiple players in an oligopoly market, the resulting multiple equilibria have made it difficult in previous studies to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static and discrete games without using unreasonable assumptions. To overcome this difficulty, the present paper proposes a practical estimation method for an entry game with three players using a Bayesian approach. Some mild assumptions are imposed on the payoff function, and the average competitive effect is used to capture the entry effect of the number of firms.Our proposed methodology is applied to Japanese airline data from the year 2000, when there were three major airline companies, ANA, JAL and JAS. The model comparison is conducted to investigate the nature of strategic interaction among these Japanese airline companies.