Political restraint of the market and levels of criminal homicide: A cross-national application of institutional-anomie theory
Political restraint of the market and levels of criminal homicide: A cross-national application of institutional-anomie theory
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DOI：
10.2307/2580676
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发表时间：
1997-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Rosenfeld, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Messner, SF;Rosenfeld, R
本文探讨了将个人福祉与市场力量隔离开来的政治努力对国家凶杀率的影响。根据Esping-Andersen最近的工作和犯罪的制度失范理论，我们假设杀人的水平将与劳动力的去商品化成反比。我们根据福利支出的水平和模式制定了一个去商业化的衡量标准，并将这一衡量标准纳入对凶杀率的多变量跨国分析。研究结果支持了我们的假设，并为制度失范的观点提供了可信度。去商业化的程度与杀人率呈负相关，不考虑国家的其他特征。
This article examines the effects on national homicide rates of political efforts to insulate personal well-being from market forces. Drawing upon recent work by Esping-Andersen and the institutional-anomie theory of crime, we hypothesize that levels of homicide will vary inversely with the ''decommodification of labor.'' We develop a measure of decommodification based on levels and patterns of welfare expenditures and include this measure in a multivariate, cross-national analysis of homicide rates. The results Its support our hypothesis and lend credibility to the institutionan-anomie perspective. The degree of decommodification is negatively related to homicide rates, net of controls for other characteristics of nations.