Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack
Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack
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DOI：
10.1080/10576100490466498
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发表时间：
2004-01-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
McCormick, Gordon H.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hoffman, Bruce;McCormick, Gordon H.
这篇文章考察了自杀式恐怖主义的战略效用。我们认为，自杀式恐怖主义可以被视为一种战略“信号”。我们将恐怖主义定义为一种信号游戏，在这种游戏中，恐怖袭击被用来向一组目标受众传达一个组织的特征和目标。接下来是对自杀式袭击作为一种信号策略的效用的审查。与恐怖组织传统上可用的其他战术选择相比，对自杀行动的相对有效性进行了评估。我们继续审查自杀式恐怖主义的体制和社会背景，最后审查巴勒斯坦恐怖组织和泰米尔伊拉姆猛虎解放组织不断演变地使用自杀式袭击的情况。
This article examines the strategic utility of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism, we suggest, can be thought of as a form of strategic "signaling." We define terrorism as a signaling game in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group's character and objectives to a set of target audiences. This is followed by an examination of the utility of suicide attacks as a signaling tactic. The relative effectiveness of suicide operations is evaluated in relation to other tactical options that are traditionally available to terrorist organizations. We go on to examine the institutional and social context of suicide terrorism, concluding with an examination of the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.