The effects on sick leave of changes in the sickness insurance system
The effects on sick leave of changes in the sickness insurance system
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DOI：
10.1086/380404
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发表时间：
2004-01-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Persson, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Henrekson, M;Persson, M
为了更全面地了解劳动力供应如何受到经济激励的影响，应该考虑对缺勤的影响。特别是，因病假而缺勤的情况可能相当严重。我们研究了病假补偿水平是否会影响病假行为。使用长期的时间序列数据（1955年至1999年）与瑞典的补偿水平的许多变化，我们通常会发现强烈的影响。意味着对病假给予更慷慨补偿的改革往往与病假的永久性增加有关，反之亦然。一项涵盖1983- 1991年期间的小组研究证实了这些调查结果。
To get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism should be taken into account. In particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. We examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using long time series data (1955-99) for Sweden with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in sick leave, and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.