Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game

Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game
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投资游戏中的信任和可信声誉

DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.002
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发表时间:
2011-06-01
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Yang, Chun-Lei
Yang, Chun-Lei
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Charness, Gary;Du, Ninghua;Yang, Chun-Lei

文献摘要

被引文献

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信任是良好社会成果和有效经济绩效的重要组成部分。事实证明,在同一角色中,受托人过去行为的声誉对提高信任水平非常有效。在本研究中,我们证明了提供受托人过去作为受托人的行为信息与信誉系统同样有效。事实上,人们仍然觉得投资于一个值得信任的人的声誉是值得的,即使信任的直接回报很低。这证实了间接互惠作为一种基于声誉的战略概念的作用,即一个人对另一个人的亲社会行为得到了第三方的认可。(C) 2010爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance. Reputation on the trustee's past behavior in the same role has proven to be greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing information on the trustee's past behavior as the trustor is equally effective as a reputation system. In fact, people still find it worthwhile to invest in a reputation as a trusting person, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is poor. This confirms the role of indirect reciprocity as a strategic notion based on reputation, whereby pro-social actions by one person towards a second person are sanctioned by a third party. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.