Presupposition projection from quantificational sentences: trivalence, local accommodation, and presupposition strengthening
Presupposition projection from quantificational sentences: trivalence, local accommodation, and presupposition strengthening
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量化句子的预设投影：三价、局部调节和预设强化
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9781139519328.011
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Fox
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文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Fox
这篇论文的主要目的是理解与量词短语投射其论元预设的方式有关的相互冲突的数据。更具体地说，我将试图论证，事实可以在三种预设投射的方法中被理解，2当与两个独立需要的机制相结合时，(A)一个加强预设(需要处理所谓的但书问题)和(B)在不同范围的位置将预设纳入真理条件的另一个机制(“局部调节”)。第二个目标是提供一些粗略的评论，说明如何在经典的二价系统中借助于修改的桥原则来推导三价预测--修改Stalnaker(1974)提出的将形式预设与语言使用的语用条件联系起来的原则。3本论文的结构安排如下。前三节将对来自数量句子的预设投射理论提出经验挑战。我们将看到，挑战来自判断中的三个变化性来源。第一个问题涉及个别发言者之间的差异：一些发言者报告的判断与极弱的预设相一致，而其他发言者的判断要求更强的预设--在某些情况下，看起来需要普遍的预测。第二个可变性来源与量词的性质有关：似乎强烈的判断需要区分不同的量词(一些量词似乎反映普遍的压力，而另一些则不是)。可变性的第三个来源与预设触发语的性质有关：所有量词和所有发言者似乎都提供了在所谓强触发语背景下普遍投射的证据。特别是，关于预设投射理论应分为两个部分的想法：(A)概念上简单的投射理论，它不存在左右不对称；(B)“递增”该投射理论从而引入不对称的原则。Schlenker的工作的意义从本文的介绍中并不清楚，它完全避免了组件(B)(增量)。但如果没有施伦克的论文，就不可能避免这一部分。施伦克教我们如何从左右不对称中抽象出来，以及如何重新引入它们(通过量化“好的期末”)。当我们希望避免递增时，我们需要将注意力限制在预测…的投影的问题上
The main goal of this paper is to make sense of conflicting data pertaining to the way quantifier phrases project the presuppositions of their arguments. More specifically, I will try to argue that the facts can be understood within trivalent approaches to presupposition projection, 2 when coupled with two independently needed mechanisms (a) one which strengthens presuppositions (needed to deal with the so called " proviso problem ") and (b) another which incorporates presuppositions into truth conditions at various scope positions (" local accommodation "). A secondary goal is to provide some sketchy remarks on how the trivalent predictions could be derived in a classical bivalent system with the aid of a modified bridge principle – a modification of the principle suggested in Stalnaker (1974) to connect formal presuppositions to pragmatic conditions of language use. 3 The paper is organized as follows. The first three sections will present empirical challenges for a theory of presupposition projection that come from quantificational sentences. We will see that the challenges come from three sources of variability in judgments. The first pertains to differences among individual speakers: some speakers report judgments that are consistent with extremely weak presuppositions whereas the judgments of other speakers require much stronger presuppositions – in some cases it looks like universal projection is required. The second source of variability pertains to the nature of the quantifier: it seems that the strong judgments require a distinction among different quantifiers (some quantifiers appear to project universal pressupositions whereas others do not). The third source of variability pertains to the nature of the presupposition trigger: all quantifiers and all speakers appear to provide evidence for universal projection in the context of so-called strong triggers. in particular, on the idea that the theory of presupposition projection should be divided into two components: (a) a conceptually simple theory of projection which has no left right asymmetry and (b) a principle that " incrementalizes " this theory of projection thus introducing asymmetry. The significance of Schlenker's work is not clear from the presentation in this paper, which entirely avoids component (b) (incrementalization). But avoiding this component would have been impossible without Schlenker's paper. Schlenker teaches us how to abstract away from left-right asymmetries and how to reintroduce them (by quantifying over " good finals "). When we wish to avoid incrementalization, we need to limit our attention to the problem of predicting the projection of …