Coalition-proof Equilibria in a Voluntary Participation Game
Coalition-proof Equilibria in a Voluntary Participation Game
复制标题
自愿参与博弈中的防联盟均衡
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Ryusuke Shinohara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Federico Quartieri;Ryusuke Shinohara;Ryusuke Shinohara
We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium understrict dominationif and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium underweak domination.
