Decision-making dynamics in the European Commission: partisan, national or sectoral?
Decision-making dynamics in the European Commission: partisan, national or sectoral?
复制标题
欧盟委员会的决策动态：党派、国家还是部门？
DOI：
10.1080/13501760802407656
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
A. Wonka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Wonka
欧盟委员会在制定政策建议和制定欧盟立法议程方面的垄断权力，保证了它在欧盟立法研究中占有相当重要的地位。它通常被定义为一个单一的行动者，在欧盟决策中团结一致地行动——通常是为了自己的超国家利益。然而，最近的理论发展和实证研究对这一概念提出了质疑。本文探讨了这些问题，并探讨了委员会行政政治的决策机制和动态。两个案例研究表明，按照职权组合进行的正式权力划分使正式负责的专员处于特权地位，可以在内部决策中影响立法建议的内容。但是，由于其他委员的反对，这种影响受到限制。至少在这里研究的案例中，委员们在内部决策中的立场和冲突遵循的是一种全国性的模式，在某种程度上，是一种行业模式，而不是一种党派模式。
Its monopoly power to formulate policy proposals and set the European Union's (EU's) legislative agenda guarantees the European Commission considerable prominence in EU legislative studies. It is commonly conceptualized as a unitary actor, acting cohesively – often in its own supranational interest – in EU decision-making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies, however, cast doubt on this conceptualization. This paper takes up these matters and investigates the decision-making mechanisms and dynamics of the Commission's executive politics. Two case studies show that the formal division of power along portfolios puts formally responsible Commissioners in a privileged position to influence the content of legislative proposals in internal decision-making. This influence, however, is circumscribed by the opposition of other Commissioners. At least in the cases studied here, Commissioners’ position-taking and conflict in internal decision-making follow a national and, to some extent, a sectoral rather than a partisan pattern.