A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
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DOI：
10.1287/opre.2020.2039
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发表时间：
2016-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alon Eden;M. Feldman;Ophir Friedler;Inbal Talgam-Cohen;S. M. Weinberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alon Eden;M. Feldman;Ophir Friedler;Inbal Talgam-Cohen;S. M. Weinberg
最近关于近似最优收入最大化的文献表明，在代理商对物品的估价是免费补充的情况下，单独销售物品并将它们捆绑在一起的效果越好，就能保证最优收入的恒定比例。然而，大多数现实世界的设置涉及项目之间的某种程度的互补性。互补性在简单性与最优性之间的权衡中所扮演的角色一直是这个难题中明显缺失的一部分。在“一个简单的和近似最优的机制，为买方与补充，”作者表明，同样简单的销售机制-更好的单独销售，并作为一个大的斗争-保证$\Theta（d）$分数的最佳收入，其中$d$是一个衡量程度的互补性。一个关键的建模贡献是一个易于处理的概念“互补程度”，承认有意义的结果和见解，他们表明，以前的定义在这方面的不足。
Recent literature on approximately optimal revenue maximization has shown that in settings where agent valuations for items are complement free, the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together guarantees a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. However, most real-world settings involve some degree of complementarity among items. The role that complementarity plays in the trade-off of simplicity versus optimality has been an obvious missing piece of the puzzle. In “A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements,” the authors show that the same simple selling mechanism—the better of selling separately and as a grand bundle—guarantees a $\Theta(d)$ fraction of the optimal revenue, where $d$ is a measure of the degree of complementarity. One key modeling contribution is a tractable notion of “degree of complementarity” that admits meaningful results and insights—they demonstrate that previous definitions fall short in this regard.