A Sophisticated Anti-Eavesdropping Strategy
A Sophisticated Anti-Eavesdropping Strategy
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DOI：
10.1109/lwc.2022.3174573
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发表时间：
2022-07
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
A. Garnaev;W. Trappe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Garnaev;W. Trappe
无线网络容易受到恶意攻击，尤其是那些涉及窃听的攻击。在这封信中，我们考虑了一种新型的反窃听策略，除了提高保密率的基本目标之外，还希望以对手最不可预测的方式实现这一目标。我们通过一个非零和博弈来建模这个问题，其中控制中心（称为发送器）必须在意图窃听此通信的对手存在的情况下与分配在安全区域的一组节点进行通信。发送方希望在两个目标之间找到一个平衡点：(a)提高预期的保密率，(b)以最不可预测的方式对对手保持这种秘密通信。作为发射器不可预测性的度量，我们考虑其策略的香农熵。我们通过一个非零和的、双方参与的资源分配博弈来模拟这个问题。以封闭形式找到了平衡，并说明了其对通信网络参数的依赖关系。最后，根据比例公平准则对发射机基本目标和次要目标的权重系数进行优化。
Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving eavesdropping. In this letter, we consider a new type of anti-eavesdropping strategy which, beyond the basic goal of increasing the secrecy rate, also wants to achieve this in the most unpredictable way for the adversary. We model the problem by a non-zero sum game where a control center (called the transmitter) must communicate with a group of nodes allocated in security zone in the presence of an adversary intent on eavesdropping upon this communication. The transmitter wants to find a trade-off between two goals: (a) to increase the expected secrecy rate, and (b) to maintain such secret communication in the most unpredictable way for the adversary. As a metric for unpredictability of the transmitter we consider the Shannon entropy of its strategy. We model this problem by a nonzero-sum, two-player resource allocation game. The equilibrium is found in closed form, and its dependence on communication network parameters is illustrated. Finally, weighting coefficients for the basic and secondary goals of the transmitter are optimized based on proportional fairness criteria.