Achieving Keyless CDNs with Conclaves
Achieving Keyless CDNs with Conclaves
复制标题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stephen Herwig;Christina Garman;Dave Levin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stephen Herwig;Christina Garman;Dave Levin
内容交付网络（CDN）服务于当今Web内容的很大一部分，并且越来越多。除了缓存之外，CDN还为客户提供各种服务，包括针对DDoS和有针对性的攻击的保护。随着网络从HTTP转向HTTPS，CDN继续通过控制客户的私钥来提供此类服务，从而打破了一个基本的安全原则：私钥必须只有其所有者知道。我们目前的设计和实施的凤凰，第一个真正的“无钥匙CDN”。Phoenix使用安全区域（特别是英特尔SGX）来托管Web内容、存储敏感密钥材料、应用Web应用程序防火墙，以及在其他不受信任的机器上执行更多操作。为了支持可伸缩性和多租户，Phoenix是围绕一个新的架构原语构建的，我们称之为conclaves：enclaves的容器。Conclave使部署多进程、可扩展的遗留应用程序变得简单。我们还开发了一个文件系统来扩展安全区的安全保证，以不受信任的存储。在其最强大的配置中，Phoenix将边缘服务器的知识减少到传统的路径上HTTPS对手的知识。我们用一系列微观和宏观基准来评估Phoenix的性能。
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) serve a large and increasing portion of today’s web content. Beyond caching, CDNs provide their customers with a variety of services, including protection against DDoS and targeted attacks. As the web shifts from HTTP to HTTPS, CDNs continue to provide such services by also assuming control of their customers’ private keys, thereby breaking a fundamental security principle: private keys must only be known by their owner. We present the design and implementation of Phoenix, the first truly “keyless CDN”. Phoenix uses secure enclaves (in particular Intel SGX) to host web content, store sensitive key material, apply web application firewalls, and more on otherwise untrusted machines. To support scalability and multitenancy, Phoenix is built around a new architectural primitive which we call conclaves: containers of enclaves. Conclaves make it straightforward to deploy multi-process, scalable, legacy applications. We also develop a filesystem to extend the enclave’s security guarantees to untrusted storage. In its strongest configuration, Phoenix reduces the knowledge of the edge server to that of a traditional on-path HTTPS adversary. We evaluate the performance of Phoenix with a series of microand macro-benchmarks.