Patent protection and R&D subsidy under asymmetric information
Patent protection and R&D subsidy under asymmetric information
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专利保护与研发
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2019.04.001
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Jeon Haejun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kenta Tanaka;Yukihide Kurakawa;Takunori Ishihara; Ken-ichi Akao;Takanori Ida;田中 健太;Jeon Haejun
本文研究了信息不对称条件下的技术许可问题，并讨论了R&D政策的影响。特别是，我们研究了创新者的投资策略和政策的效率，从动态的角度来看。我们发现，完美的专利保护是最佳的对称信息下，而这是不是这样，如果许可人有私人信息。此外，我们表明，社会福利下的不对称信息是高于对称信息下的大多数专利保护水平，但后者占主导地位的最优政策的存在下，为每一个制度。研究发现，在信息对称的情况下，研发补贴是次优的，而在信息不对称的情况下，研发补贴是最优的。这使我们能够得出专利保护和R&D补贴的组合，在多个行业同时获得不对称信息下的最佳结果。
We examine a technology licensing under asymmetric information and discuss the effects of R&D policies. In particular, we investigate an innovator's investment strategy and the efficiency of policies from a dynamics perspective. We show that perfect patent protection is optimal under symmetric information, whereas this is not so if the licensor has private information. Furthermore, we show that social welfare under asymmetric information is higher than that under symmetric information for most patent protection levels, yet the latter dominates the former in the presence of an optimal policy for each regime. An R&D subsidy is found suboptimal under symmetric information, whereas it can be optimal given information asymmetry. This allows us to derive a combination of patent protection and R&D subsidy that yields the first-best results under asymmetric information in multiple industries simultaneously.