SpecBox: A Label-Based Transparent Speculation Scheme Against Transient Execution Attacks
SpecBox: A Label-Based Transparent Speculation Scheme Against Transient Execution Attacks
复制标题
SPECBOX:针对瞬态执行攻击的基于标签的透明推测方案
DOI:
10.1109/tdsc.2022.3144287
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Guoqing Harry Xu
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bowen Tang;Chenggang Wu;Zhe Wang;Lichen Jia;Pen-Chung Yew;Yueqiang Cheng;Yinqian Zhang;Chenxi Wang;Guoqing Harry Xu
Speculative execution techniques have been a cornerstone of modern processors to improve instruction-level parallelism. However, recent studies showed that this kind of techniques could be exploited by attackers to leak secret data via transient execution attacks, such as Spectre. Many defenses are proposed to address this problem, but they all face various challenges: (1) Tracking data flow in the instruction pipeline could comprehensively address this problem, but it could cause pipeline stalls and incur high performance overhead; (2) Making side effect of speculative execution imperceptible to attackers, but it often needs additional storage components and complicated data movement operations. In this article, we propose a label-based transparent speculation scheme called SpecBox. It dynamically partitions the cache system to isolate speculative data and non-speculative data, which can prevent transient execution from being observed by subsequent execution. Moreover, it uses thread ownership semaphores to prevent speculative data from being accessed across cores. In addition, SpecBoxalso enhances the auxiliary components in the cache system against transient execution attacks, such as hardware prefetcher. Our security analysis shows that SpecBoxis secure and the performance evaluation shows that the performance overhead on SPEC CPU 2006 and PARSEC-3.0 benchmarks is small.