The role of government regulatory policies in financing capital-constrained retailers under competition
The role of government regulatory policies in financing capital-constrained retailers under competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2021.102572
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发表时间：
2022-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuanguang Zhong;Tong Yang;Stefan Zillmann;Bin Cao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuanguang Zhong;Tong Yang;Stefan Zillmann;Bin Cao
许多国家的政府都实施了监管政策（如减税和提供补贴），以支持资本有限的中小企业（SMEs）的发展和运营，这些企业在实践中可能会相互竞争。为了更好地理解政府管制政策对资本受限的中小企业、银行、消费者和社会福利的影响，本文建立了一个在需求不确定的市场中由两个竞争的资本受限的零售商组成的古诺竞争模型。我们完全得到了两个零售商的最优采购决策和银行的最优贷款利率决策，并比较了两种政府支持政策（即，减税和补贴条款）的纳什博弈中的两个零售商。研究表明，两个零售商的采购成本差异对具有成本优势的零售商的采购决策有着密切的影响，并且当两个零售商的采购成本相对均衡时，在政府管制政策下，具有成本优势的零售商的订货量会比没有政府管制的零售商的订货量大。此外，当零售商与供应商的采购成本差距相对较小时，减税可以提高竞争市场中零售商的利润，而提供补贴总是可以提高不具有采购成本优势的零售商的利润。在减税的情况下，银行有动力降低对两个零售商的利率;在补贴条款下，结果相反。研究结果表明，在政府减税/补贴的情况下，银行融资对零售商、消费者和社会都是三赢的局面。数值研究表明，在提供补贴的情况下，社会福利的改善比在减税的情况下更显着。
Governments in many different countries have implemented regulatory policies (such as tax reduction and subsidy provision) to support the development and operation of capital-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may compete each other in practice. To better understand the impacts of government regulatory policies on capital-constrained SMEs, bank, consumers and social welfare, this paper develops a Cournot competition model consisting of two competing and capital-constrained retailers in a market with demand uncertainty. We obtain the optimal procurement decisions of two retailers and the optimal loan interest decision of the bank completely, and compare the effects of two government supporting policies (i.e., tax reduction and subsidy provision) in a Nash game of the two retailers. We show that the difference of the two retailers’ procurement costs closely affects the procurement decision of the retailer who possesses the cost advantage, and that this retailer orders more under government regulatory policies than without government regulation, if the procurement costs of two retailers are relatively balanced. In addition, tax reduction can improve the profits of the retailers engaged in the competitive market when the gap of their procurement costs is small relatively, whereas the subsidy provision can always improve the profit of the retailer who does not possess a procurement cost advantage. The bank is incentivized to lower its interest rate to both retailers under tax reduction; under the subsidy provision, the opposite result is true. Our finding can demonstrate that there exists a win–win–win situation for the two retailers, the consumers as well as for the society in the case of bank financing with government tax reduction/subsidy provision. The numerical studies show that the improvement of social welfare is more significant in the case of subsidy provision than that in the case of tax reduction.