Predictive Eye Movements Are Driven by Goals, Not by the Mirror Neuron System
Predictive Eye Movements Are Driven by Goals, Not by the Mirror Neuron System
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02317.x
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发表时间：
2009-04-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Vulchanova, Mila
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eshuis, Rik;Coventry, Kenny R.;Vulchanova, Mila
镜像神经元系统（MNS）作为理解他人行为的一种机制的重要性已经得到证实（例如，Rizzolatti，Fadiga，Gallese和Fogassi，1996）。灵长类动物前运动皮层的神经元在猴子执行动作（例如，抓握）时以及猴子观察到其他人执行相同动作时都会放电。也有人提出，MNS是理解他人意图和目标导向行为的起点（Fogassi et al.，2005; Gallese & Goldman，1998）。与此观点一致，Falck-Ytter，Gredebäck和von Hofsten（2006）认为MNS与主动目标导向（预测）眼球运动有关。在一系列眼动追踪研究中，参与者观察一个玩具物体沿着沿着向一个容器移动。成人和1岁的婴儿只在观察到一只手移动玩具时（人类代理条件）才向前看玩具和目标容器。在另外两种情况下，没有发现主动的目标导向的眼球运动：一种是自我推进的情况，即一个具有基本面部特征的玩具沿着沿着移动;另一种是机械运动的情况，即一个没有明显特征的球沿着沿着移动。Falck-Ytter等人将这些数据解释为MNS对于主动目标导向眼球运动是必要的证据。此外，6个月大的婴儿（他们太小，无法自己执行动作）缺乏主动的目标导向的眼球运动，这进一步支持了MNS帐户。这些说法为时过早。Falck-Ytter et al.（2006）不区分与意图相关的预测人类运动和与意图相关的预测代理目标。与镜像神经元假设一致，手的运动可能必然涉及通过MNS模拟运动，因此，只有当手被显示移动物体时，主动的目标导向眼球运动才可能发生。或者，一只手移动一个物体涉及代理的意图，将物体放在目标容器中，并且代理意图将物体最终放在目标位置的预期可能会导致主动眼球运动（与目的论立场理论一致; German & Csibra，2003）。为了在这些帐户之间进行仲裁，有必要运行一个没有人类移动的人类代理条件。因此，我们着手检验Falck-Ytter等人的主张。（2006），但增加了原始研究中缺失的新的临界条件。我们运行了三个运动条件：人类-代理条件，其中显示人类代理将玩具青蛙移向目标容器（即，[1人的代理，1人的运动]）;自我推进的条件，其中没有人的代理被显示移动青蛙（即，[非人类代理，非人类运动]）;而在新的条件下，一个人类代理人被显示为手在青蛙的起点后面，轻弹它，以推动它沿着沿着前进（如在游戏“Tiddlywinks”中;即[1人类代理，人类运动];见图1a）。在后一种情况下，人-主体意图与人-主体条件的意图相匹配，但是人的运动不会沿着轨迹示出。这就允许对MNS和目标-意图解释的主动眼动数据进行清晰的测试。在Falck-Ytter et al.（2006），当玩具物体到达水桶时，会播放一个声音，并在水桶上显示一个笑脸。这可能有助于提高目标状态的可取性，鼓励积极的眼球运动的方式一致…
The importance of a mirror neuron system (MNS) as a mechanism for understanding the actions of others has been established (eg, Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Neurons in the primate premotor cortex fire both when a monkey performs an action (eg, grasping) and when the monkey observes someone else performing the same action. It has also been proposed that the MNS is the starting point for understanding the intentions and goal-directed behavior of others (Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Consistent with this view, Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, and von Hofsten (2006) argued that the MNS is implicated in proactive goal-directed (predictive) eye movements. In a series of eye-tracking studies, participants observed a toy object moving along a trajectory toward a container. Adults and 1-year-old infants looked ahead of the toy and toward the goal container only when a hand was observed moving the toy (the human-agent condition). Proactive goaldirected eye movements were not found in two further conditions: a self-propelled condition, in which a toy with rudimentary facial features moved along the trajectory by itself, or a mechanical motion condition, in which a ball with no distinctive features moved along the trajectory. Falck-Ytter et al. interpreted these data as evidence that the MNS is necessary for proactive goal-directed eye movements. Moreover, the absence of proactive goal-directed eye movements in 6-month-old infants (who are too young to perform the actions themselves) is taken as further support for the MNS account. These claims are premature. The conditions run by Falck-Ytter et al.(2006) do not discriminate between predicted human motion tied to intention and predicted agent goals tied to intention. Consistent with the mirror neuron hypothesis, movement of the hand may necessarily involve the simulation of motion via the MNS, and proactive goal-directed eye movements may therefore only occur when a hand is shown to move the object. Alternatively, a hand moving an object involves the intention of an agent to place the object in the goal container, and the expectation that the agent intends for the object to end up in a goal location may cause the proactive eye movements (consistent with teleological stance theory; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). To arbitrate between these accounts, it is necessary to run a human-agent condition without human movement. Therefore, we set out to test the claims of Falck-Ytter, et al.(2006), but with the addition of a new critical condition missing in the original study. We ran three movement conditions: the human-agent condition, in which a human agent was shown moving a toy frog toward a goal container (ie,[1human agent, 1human motion]); the self-propelled condition, in which no human agent was shown moving the frog (ie,[Àhuman agent, Àhuman motion]); and the new condition, in which a human agent was shown with hand behind the starting point of the frog, flicking it so as to propel it along a trajectory (as in the game ‘‘Tiddlywinks’’; ie,[1human agent, Àhuman motion]; see Fig. 1a). In the latter condition, the human-agent intention is matched to that of the human-agent condition, but human motion is not shown along the trajectory. This allows a clean test of the MNS versus goal-intention explanations for the proactive eye-movement data.We also ran each condition in two ways. In the original humanagent condition run by Falck-Ytter et al.(2006), when the toy object reached the bucket, a sound was played and a smiley face on the bucket was animated. This could serve to heighten the desirability of the goal state, encouraging proactive eye movements in a manner consistent …