The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively
The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively
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DOI：
10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011
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发表时间：
2011-01-01
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Dietrich, Simone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dietrich, Simone
传统观点认为，外国援助在腐败程度较低的国家更为有效。然而，最近出现的研究表明，这一论点可能过于宽泛，而且治理对援助有效性的影响被总体援助流量的研究所掩盖。我重点关注公共卫生部门，并提出了战略合规的论点：腐败的受援国政府有动力遵守捐助者的目标，但他们会在援助部门这样做，而在这些部门，合规的成本很低。我使用两步广义矩法 (GMM) 作为我的主要估计技术。我为我的论点找到了强有力的证据。 (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
Conventional wisdom suggests that foreign aid is more effective in less corrupt states. Recently, however, research is emerging that suggests that this argument may be too broad and that the effect of governance on aid effectiveness is masked by the study of aggregate aid flows. I focus on the public health sector and develop an argument of strategic compliance: corrupt recipient governments have incentives to comply with donor objectives but they will do so in aid sectors, in which compliance is cheap. I use two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as my primary estimation technique. I find strong and robust evidence for my argument. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.