Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
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DOI：
10.3390/g10010010
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发表时间：
2019-02
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Misato Inaba;N. Takahashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Misato Inaba;N. Takahashi
由于n人之间的社会困境往往嵌入在其他类型的社会交换中，因此将社会困境中的叛逃者排除在其他交换之外可以作为一种无成本的选择性激励。近年来，这种“联动”被认为是解决社会困境的一个有希望的解决方案。然而，先前的研究表明，当主观感知错误存在时，通过联动维持的合作是脆弱的。本研究的目的是找到对主观感知错误具有鲁棒性的链接策略。基于之前关于间接互惠的研究中提出的策略，我们设计了几种联动策略，并通过基于代理的模拟检验了它们的进化稳定性。仿真结果表明，即使存在感知误差，基于 kandori 的联动策略也具有进化稳定性。我们的研究为“联系是解决社会困境问题的合理解决方案”这一论点提供了实质性支持。
Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.