What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity: What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions?

What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity: What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions?
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顽固的情绪有什么问题?

DOI:
10.1111/1746-8361.12109
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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Sabine A. Döring
Sabine A. Döring
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文献类型:
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作者:
Sabine A. Döring

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我认为,在经历一种抗拒的情感时,一个人并不违反任何形式的理性要求。理性需求,正如这个表达所使用的那样,是一致性的需求(例如,在您的信念和意图中保持一致的需求)。因此,我的观点是,体验一种反抗情绪并没有什么不连贯的地方。只有当一个人允许情绪影响他的推理和/或行动时,他才会变得不连贯(即不理性),在这种情况下,他违反了“一致性原则”和/或“enkratic原则”。从理性的角度来看,把受试者置于他们的情感体验和评估判断必须始终一致的义务之下,甚至会适得其反。然而,当我们直觉地感觉到主体在经历一种反抗情绪时是非理性的这是在这种情绪挑战主体的代理身份的情况下。然而,情绪可以,但不需要,挑战一个人的代理身份,而且,感知也可以这样做。在任何情况下,这种挑战都不涉及对理性需求的违反。
I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence (for instance, the requirements to be consistent in your beliefs and in your intentions). Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent (i.e., irrational) only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement.