Are Public Servants More Honest than Private Workers?A Monetary Incentivized Experiment in Japan
Are Public Servants More Honest than Private Workers?A Monetary Incentivized Experiment in Japan
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公务员比私人工作者更诚实吗？日本的货币激励实验
DOI：
10.11167/jbef.14.s23
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
So Morikawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Manami Tsuruta;Takeshi Ojima;Reona Hayashi;So Morikawa
私营部门和公共部门的工人偏好相同吗？为防止公务员舞弊，私营部门常用的方法在公共部门是否有效？为了回答这些问题，我们进行了一项在线实验，以调查私人和公共工作人员不诚实行为的差异。实验结果表明，公务员比私人工作者更诚实。私营工人和公务员之间的不诚实行为与人口变量之间的相关性有所不同。我们发现，私营工人和公务员之间的不诚实与经济偏好（例如风险偏好）之间的相关性几乎不同。我们的研究结果表明，在私营部门实施的相同反腐败方法可能在公共部门无效。
Are workers’ preferences the same in private and public sectors? To prevent fraud by civil servants, are the methods commonly used in the private sector effective in the public sector? To answer these questions, we conducted an online experiment to investigate the differences between private and public workers’ dishonest behaviors. The results of the experiment indicated that public servants were more honest than private workers. The correlations between dishonesty and demographic variables differed between private workers and public servants. We found that the correlations between dishonesty and economic preferences (eg, risk preference) are almost different between private workers and public servants. Our findings suggest that the same anti-corruption methods implemented in the private sector might not be effective in the public sector.