State Dependent Pricing with a Queue
State Dependent Pricing with a Queue
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DOI：
10.1080/07408170108936878
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发表时间：
2001-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hong Chen;Murray Z. Frank
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hong Chen;Murray Z. Frank
现有的研究定价时，客户排队，假设公司不能调整价格的需求状态。在大多数应用中，这个假设是错误的。我们采用Naor（1969）的经典模型，允许企业根据需求状态调整价格。当顾客同质时，企业的定价规则使社会福利最大化。当顾客是不可观测的异质性时，企业的定价规则并不能最大化社会福利。我们发现，即使在技术上和经济上可行的情况下，公司也不一定总能吸引顾客。这被解释为期权效应。给出了基本参数变化对排队长度的影响。
Existing studies of pricing when customers queue, assume that the firm cannot adjust the price to the state of demand. In most applications this assumption is false. We adapt the classic model of Naor (1969) to allow the firm to adjust the price to the state of demand. When customers are homogeneous the firm's pricing rule maximizes social welfare. When customers are unobservably heterogenous, the firm's pricing rule does not maximize social welfare. We find that the firm may not always attract customers even when it is technically and economically feasible to do so. This is interpreted as an option effect. The effects of changes to the basic parameters, on the queue length are presented.