Individualism, type specimens, and the scrutability of species membership
Individualism, type specimens, and the scrutability of species membership
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DOI：
10.1023/a:1010674915907
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发表时间：
2001-06-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Levine, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Levine, A
吉塞林和赫尔提出的物种是个体的观点被吹捧为解释了模式标本在分类学中的作用。这种解释与克里普克-普特南名称理论的密切关系早已得到认可。然而，鉴于这种亲缘关系，赫尔对模式标本的描述可以被视为带来两个相关的难以理解的问题——对生物学知识的性质和范围的不合理限制。对这些问题的认识促使我们思考科学哲学中形而上学和认识论探究之间的适当关系。
The view that species are individuals, as developed by Ghiselin and Hull, has been touted as explaining the role of type specimens in taxonomy. The kinship of this explanation with the Kripke-Putnam theory of names has long been recognized. In light of this kinship, however, Hull's account of type specimens can be seen to entail two related inscrutability problems - unreasonable limits placed on the nature and extent of biological knowledge. An appreciation for these problems invites us to consider the proper relation between metaphysical and epistemological inquires in the philosophy of science.